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Find your body without organs. Find out how to make it.  It's a question  
of life and death, youth and old age, sadness and joy. It is where  
everything is played out. 
      -- Deleuze and Guattari		In	this	chapter	I	will	consider	the	relationship	between	technology	and	the	human	body.	Most contemporary debates about this relationship have been 
dominated by the notion that digital technology, particularly computers and the 
Internet, are somehow alienating us from our physical bodies. Some worry, for 
example, that computers are turning our young people into a generation of sedentary 
and dangerously obese ‘net potatoes’ who have lost all awareness of their bodies, 
while others are concerned that the increased objectification and externalization of the 
body made possible by technology has reduced human beings to simulacra and 
human relationships to ‘figments of the imagination’ (Varga 2005:228). As Arthur 
and Marilouise Korker (1987:2) put it, ‘in technological	society,	the	body	has	achieved	a	purely	rhetorical	existence:	its	reality	is	that	of	refuse	expelled	as	surplus-matter	no	longer	necessary	for	the	autonomous	functioning	of	the	technoscape.’	There	are	those,	on	the	other	hand,	who	think	that	this	is	not	such	a	bad	thing.	They	celebrate	the	freedom	from	the	physical	body	which	digital	technology	supposedly	affords	and	dream	of	a	utopian	future	in	which	flesh	and	
blood	bodies	are	traded	in	for	avatars	that	are	immune	to	sickness,	old	age,	as	well	as	the	bodily	markers	of	identity	(like	race,	gender	and	disability)	that	lead	to	discrimination	and	inequality	(see	for	example	Cromby	and	Standon	1999,	Haraway	1991,	Turkle	1995).		The	problem	with	both	of	these	perspectives	is	that,	while	engaging	in	complex	conjecture	about	utopian	or	dystopian	futures,	they	ignore	what	is	actually	going	on	with	technology	right	now,	how	computers	and	the	Internet	are	actually	(rather	than	theoretically)	changing	the	way	we	think	about,	interact	with	and	use	our	physical	bodies.	Much	empirical	evidence	(see	for	example	Ho	and	Lee	2001,	Orleans	and	Laney	2000)	indicates,	for	instance,	that	teenagers	who	spend	more	time	online	do	not	necessarily	engage	less	in	physical	activities	like	sports	and	in	fact	often	enjoy	even	more	active	social	relationships	than	others.	Furthermore,	even	the	most	cursory	journey	through	the	tangle	of	social	networking	sites,	webcam	portals	and	dating	services	that	make	up	today’s	internet	landscape	should	be	enough	to	convince	us	that,	far	from	having	been	‘erased’,	the	body	seems	in	many	ways	more	obtrusive	than	ever	before. As 
Stone (1991:111) has pointed out ‘no matter how virtual the subject may become, 
there is always a body attached. It may be off somewhere else - and that “somewhere 
else” may be a privileged point of view - but consciousness remains firmly rooted in 
the physical.’	That	is	not	to	say	that	our	relationships	with	our	bodies	have	remained	unchanged	in	the	face	our	increased	ability	to	pixilate,	manipulate	and	project	them	over	large	distances.	Just	the	opposite;	this	change	has	been	profound.	The	ability	to	externalize	the	body,	to	turn	it	into	a	text,	however,	is	not	particularly	new,	and	the	kinds	of	changes	we	are	seeing	in	the	status	of	the	human	body	
brought	on	by	digital	technologies	represent	more	of	evolution	than	a	radical	departure	from	the	past.		The	questions	I	will	be	asking	in	this	chapter,	then,	have	to	do	with	how	the	process	of	entextualizing	our	bodies	affects	the	way	we	think	about	them	and	use	them	in	the	physical	world,	and	how	this	process	has	changed	with	the	development	of	digital	technology.	I	will	use	as	the	foundation	of	my	argument	principles	of	mediated	discourse	analysis	(Norris	and	Jones		2005,	Scollon	2001),	a	perspective	which	focuses	on	how	texts	and	other	cultural	tools	mediate	human	activities	and	social	identities.			The	central	concept	in	mediated	discourse	analysis	is	that	of	mediation,	which	has	its	roots	in	the	work	of	Soviet	psychologist	Lev	Vygotsky.	For	Vygotsky,	all	thoughts	and	actions	are	mediated	through	artifacts	or	‘cultural	tools’.	Since	different	kinds	of	tools	make	different	kinds	of	thoughts	or	actions	either	more	or	less	possible,	mediation	has	a	profound	effect	on	limiting	and	focusing	human	activity	and	cognition.	‘The	inclusion	of	a	tool	in	the	process	of	behavior,’	writes	Vygotsky	(1981:139-140)	‘alters	the	course…	of	all	the	mental	processes	that	enter	into	the	composition	of	the	instrumental	act	(and)	re-creates	and	reorganizes	the	whole	structure	of	behavior.’		Cultural	tools	can	be	either	physical	(hammers,	screwdrivers,	computers)	or	psychological	(language,	counting	systems,	conventional	schemes	of	writing	and	speaking,	conventional	signs,	and	systems	of	thought	and	ideology)	(Jones	2001,	Wertsch	1998).	For	Wertsch,	all	cultural	tools,	however,	are	essentially	material	as,	in	order	to	be	used	to	perform	actions,	psychological	tools	must	undergo	some	kind	of	physical	instantiation:	ideas	and	languages	must	be	transformed	into	spoken	utterances	or	written	texts.	At	the	same	time,	all	tools	
are	also	psychological	or	semiotic,	that	is,	they	exist	simultaneously	as	objects	in	the	world	and	in	the	minds	of	users	as	mental	representations	imbued	with	meaning.	It	is	this	semiotic	or	‘textual’	dimension	of	meditational	means		--	the	relationship	between	what	cultural	tools	‘mean’	and	what	we	can	do	with	them	--which	is	of	particular	concern	to	mediated	discourse	analysts.		One	cultural	tool	which	has	received	relatively	little	attention	in	this	model	is	the	human	body	itself,	although	some,	like	Randolph	(2000)	and	Nelson	(2002)	have	pointed	out	how	people	make	use	of	other	social	actors	as	meditational	means	to	accomplish	actions:	a	kidnapper	uses	the	body	of	a	hostage	to	shield	himself	from	gunfire;	crowds	are	used	by	promoters	and	politicians	at	sporting	events	and	rallies	to	create	an	ambiance	of	excitement;	medical	students	regularly	use	the	bodies	of	the	dead	to	study	anatomy;	and	physicians	use	the	bodies	of	their	patients	as	meditational	means	to	practice	medicine.	The	kinds	of	bodily	cultural	tools	I	am	concerned	with	here,	however,	are	not	the	bodies	of	others,	but	representations	of	our	own	bodies	which,	through	various	processes	of	technologization	(Jones		Scollon	2001),	we	are	able	to	separate	from	our	physical	bodies	and	appropriate	into	social	actions.	I	have	in	mind	things	like	passport	pictures,	portraits,	and	the	photos	of	ourselves	we	post	on	Facebook.	The	position	I	will	be	taking	is	that	representations	of	the	human	body	(whether	printed,	painted,	photographed,	or	pixilated)	represent	a	unique	and	powerful	class	of	meditational	means	with	their	own	special	set	of	affordances	and	constraints,	and	their	own	set	of	consequences	on	both	social	interaction	and	on	individual	cognition.		
To refer to this particular class of meditational means I will rather shamelessly 
appropriate from the French philosophers Gille Deleuze and Felix Guattari (1987) the 
term ‘bodies without organs’. Deleutz and Guattari use the term to refer to the 
‘virtual’ dimension of the body, the body freed from the ‘organization of the 
organism’, the body outside any determinate state, torn from the here and now, 
exemplified, for them, in the body of the masochist, the drug addict, the lover, and the 
schizophrenic. The subject that I will be drawing upon to illustrate my analysis may in 
fact have some similarities to these figures, for the bodies I would like to consider as 
my exemplars are the bodies of urban skateboarders – not their physical bodies, but 
the representations of their bodies they produce and consume in amateur 
skateboarding videos, which they regularly spend hours shooting and editing and 
setting to music and then distribute on Internet sites like You Tube and My Space. 
Through examining these particular virtual bodies and the practices around producing 
and consuming them, I hope to illustrate more general principles about the way I 
believe technology is affecting how representations of the body are used as texts to 
take social actions.  
Bodies	without	Organs	and	Technologies	of	Entextualization	
I say I am appropriating the term ‘bodies without organs’ shamelessly because 
much of what I mean by the term is not really part of Deleuze and Guattari’s 
definition, and much of what they mean I am not including in mine. By bodies 
without organs I simply mean all representations of our bodies that we or others make 
use of to take actions in the world. ‘Bodies without organs’ defined in this way are 
always the result of externalization, or what Bauman and Briggs (1990) call 
entextualization, the process by which discourse (in so far as the body is inherently 
discursive) is rendered ‘extractable’, able to be lifted out of its immediate spatial and 
temporal materiality and inserted into another (Jones forthcoming). 
 ‘Bodies without organs’ are characterized by five main features, which both 
distinguish them from and connect them to their physical antecedents. The first is 
deterritorialization; ‘bodies without organs’ can be separated from the physical space 
that the body occupies and transported into different spaces. The second is 
desynchronization: moments in the existence of the physical body can be captured 
and lifted out of time and used in future moments, and these bodily representations 
are often not subject to the same laws of time and space that physical bodies are. The 
third is reproducibility: ‘bodies without organs’ can be reproduced and duplicated so 
that multiple instances of the same body can exist simultaneously, a feat which, 
despite advances in cloning technology, is not yet possible with the human body. 
Fourth is mutability: ‘bodies without organs’ like other texts can be revised, edited, 
altered and re-altered in ways that are not possible with physical bodies without 
severe physical consequences; ‘bodies without organs’ always have some degree of 
plasticity, depending on the media in which they are rendered and the technologies 
that are employed in this rendering. Finally, the fifth and perhaps the most important 
feature of ‘bodies without organs’ is mimesis; ‘bodies without organs’ are above all 
representations, and their sole utility as cultural tools is based on there existing some 
kind of resemblance to or connection with some actual physical body existing (or 
supposedly existing) somewhere. ‘Bodies without organs’ qualify as a special class of 
cultural tools precisely because of the reflexive relationship they have to the 
particular, concrete human bodies that they represent.  
 One example of such a cultural tool is my Hong Kong identity card, on which 
appears a picture of me as I appeared in 1997 when I became a permanent resident of 
Hong Kong.  This photograph, however, is not the only representation of my body 
that appears on the card. It also contains a textual ‘body without organs’ in the form 
of my name and various information about my body, and, in the corner of the card, an 
electronic chip that contains an image of my thumbprint. With this tool I can perform 
a whole host of actions that would be physically or legally impossible without it. I can 
carry it in my pocket. I can make a Xerox copy of it and fax it to my bank when 
applying for a mortgage. And I can use it to enter and leave the Special 
Administrative Region of Hong Kong through a special turnstile that collects an 
image of my actual thumbprint and compares it to the image embedded in the 
electronic chip.  
 This example, in fact, illustrates a number of other important aspects of 
‘bodies without organs’, in particular the fact that they are always partial, that a ‘body 
without organs’ can never be a ‘copy’ of the original body and often represents the 
body through synecdoche,	with	a	part	of	the	body	like	the	face	or	the	fingerprint	signifying	the	entire	body.	Furthermore,	bodies	without	organs	are	often	deployed	in	‘semiotic	aggregates’	(Scollon	and	Scollon	2003),	with	several	different	representations	working	together	to	complement	or	verify	one	another.	Finally,	despite	the	potential	for	despatialization	and	deterritorialization	inherent	in	‘bodies	without	organs’,	many	ways	in	which	they	are	used	require	the	physical	body	and	its	representation	to	be	co-present,	as	when	I	use	my	passport	or	ID	card	to	cross	a	border	or	a	student	uses	hers	buy	alcohol	in	a	bar.	For	such	actions	to	be	performed	successfully,	the	‘body	without	organs’	requires	the	presence	of	its	antecedent:	as	any	college	student	will	tell	you,	you	cannot	buy	a	drink	if	you	have	left	your	ID	at	home.		 Here	is	where	Deleuze and Guattari and their followers would no doubt 
cringe, for nothing could be farther than their conception of the ‘body without organs’ 
as a ‘field of intensities’ than the example I have just given. In fact, they have another 
term for such objects as passport photos and mug shots and other socially orchestrated 
captures of the body, especially those based on categorizations like gender, race and 
national origin. These they call ‘incorporeal transformations’, and their function is not 
to facilitate flows of desire, but to control it, to fix it into various assemblages as 
determined by institutions (the state, the church, the prison). They are operations of 
discipline that aim to enforce particular regimes of representation and economies of 
meaning (Foucault 1979). 
 The reason I have chosen to use the same term to describe both of these 
phenomena is that they really do not describe different objects, but rather different 
kinds of actions that can be taken with the same object. The field of possibilities 
which Deleuze and Guattari image to be ‘the body without organs’ and the 
disciplinary regimes of ‘incorporeal transformations’ are simply two different sides of 
entextualization, two different potentials present in all representations of the body. I 
will refer to these as the potential for virtualization and the potential for reification. 
Reification is based on disembodiment and alienation. Its aim is to transform a 
dynamic process into a fixed object: an identity, a document, a piece of evidence. 
Virtualiztion on the other hand, has the opposite effect: rather than closing down 
possibilities, it opens them up. It is a kind of problematization of the body. In the 
words of Pierre Lévy (1998:44):  virtualization	involves	a	change	of	identity,	a	transition	from	a	particular	solution	to	a	general	problematic,	the	transformation	of	a	specific	and	circumscribed	activity	into	a	delocalized,	desynchronized,	and	collectivized	functioning.	The	virtualization	of	the	body	is	therefore	not	a	form	of	disembodiment	but	a	recreation,	a	reincarnation.	a	multiplication,	vectorization.	and	heterogenesis	of	the	human.	However,	the	boundary	between	heterogenesis	and	alienation,	actualization	and	commodity	
reification,	virtualization	and	amputation.	is	never	clearly	defined.	This	uncertain	boundary	must	constantly	be	estimated	and	evaluated.		Of	course	there	are	a	whole	host	of	factors	–	social,	economic	and	material	–	which	determine	whether	or	not	the	representations	of	the	body	created	under	particular	circumstances	will	be	used	for	reification	or	for	virtualization.	This	chiefly	depends,	however,	on	the	kinds	of	‘technologies	of	entextualization’	(Jones	forthcoming)	that	are	available,	and	on	who	controls	these	technologies,	and	on	the	kinds	of	concrete	social	actions	these	technologies	and	their	products	are	used	to	take.		
The different kinds of technologies of entextualization which have developed 
over the years have introduced new sets of affordances and constraints regarding the 
processes of deterritorialization, despatializtion, reproducibility, mutability, and 
mimesis which I discussed above, and these configurations of affordances and 
constraints have had consequences on how the ‘bodies without organs’ that result 
from these processes can be used. The degree of deterritorialization enabled by digital 
technology, for example, which can send representations of the body instantaneously 
across the globe is very different from that enabled by drawing or print technology, 
and the degree of mimesis afforded by photography differs radically from that of 
drawing or painting. 
One of the most important innovations in portraiture in the seventeenth 
century, for example, was the increased portability of images. With the development 
of miniature portraits, representations of the body could be transported in ones pocket 
or in a piece of jewelry and could be used for private rather than public viewing. An 
innovation of the eighteenth century was the development of pastel portraiture, which 
allowed artists to create significantly more lifelike ‘bodies without organs’, so lifelike 
and seemingly touchable, in fact, that, according to art historian Shearer West (2004), 
they began to take on an ‘an erotic or fetishistic quality’.  
Perhaps the chief function of ‘bodies without organs’ in this era was 
memorialization, a function fulfilled in the modern world with family snapshots. 
People had their portraits painted to be remembered, and even miniature portraits 
exchanged between lovers were often referred to as ‘remembrances’. This particular 
function is important not just for individual relationships that spanned across space 
and time, but also for the creation of social cohesion, as when the portraits of kings 
were displayed in public places. Such bodies without organs were integral to people’s 
ability to ‘imagine communities’ (Anderson 2006), whether those communities were 
families or nations. 
Perhaps the most significant advance in technologies for representing the 
human body, however, came with the development of photography, which facilitated 
more than ever before the documentary and evidentiary functions of ‘bodies without 
organs’. No technology, perhaps, is more emblematic of the modern era, what 
Benjamin (1969) calls ‘the age mechanical reproduction’, than analog photography, 
and it was during this time that the entextualization of the body became increasingly 
associated with discipline and surveillance. Whereas in the past, bodies without 
organs served a primarily retrospective function oriented towards past events, in the 
era of analog photography their primary function became as documents, oriented 
towards their future use.	Photography	became	a	central	tool	for	journalists,	police	officers,	hospitals,	schools,	insane	asylums,	prisons,	and	departments	of	immigration	and	public	health,	and	photographs	themselves	began	to	take	on	a	truth	value	which	paintings	never	had;	they	could	be	used,	for	example,	to	prove	or	disprove	ones	identity	or	to	convict	one	of	a	crime	(Tagg	1999).		
At	the	turn	of	the	century,	however,	a	development	occurred	in	photography	that	irreversibly	altered	the	disciplinary	nature	of	the	technology:	the	invention	and	marketing	by	Eastman	Kodak	of	the	small	personal	camera.	Suddenly	for	the	first	time	in	history	people	had	at	their	command	means	to	produce	highly	accurate	representations	of	their	own	and	others	bodies	for	their	personal	use.	This	change	in	control	over	the	means	of	production	of	‘bodies	without	organs’	gave	to	photographs	a	more	reflective	function:	photography	became	not	just	about	being	looked	at	by	the	other,	but	about	looking	at	and	reflecting	upon	oneself,	and	these	acts	of	self	reflection	(and,	as	Foucault	might	add,	‘self-disciplining’)	facilitated	by	rituals	of	taking	and	viewing	photographs	became	an	integral	part	of	bourgeois	family	life.	Bourdieu	(1990:83),	for	example,	commenting	upon	the	rise	of	photography	as	an	amateur	pastime,	remarks	how	in	such	family	rituals,	‘looking	at	the	person	who	is	looking	(or	who	is	taking	the	photograph),	correcting	one's	posture,	one	presents	oneself	to	be	looked	at	as	one	seeks	to	be	looked	at;	one	presents	one's	own	image.’	The	family	photograph,	then,	became	a	materialization	of	what	Cooley	(1902),	and	later	Mead,	referred	to	as	‘the	looking	glass	self’.		
The rise of digital photography and video and of computers and the Internet, 
of course, further increased individuals’ potential to create and control their own 
bodily representations, but the more important change came with their increased 
ability to alter these representations, to combine them with other representations, to 
make them more immediate and interactive, and to disseminate them at an 
unprecedented speed to an unprecedented number of people. The increased mutability 
of ‘bodies without organs’ brought on by digital technology seriously undermined the 
evidentiary function of such objects as the truth value of photographs became 
compromised (Mitchell 1992). At the same time, however, it strengthened another 
function, one I have not yet addressed, what I will be calling the anticipatory function 
of ‘bodies without organs’.   
The anticipatory function of ‘bodies without organs’ is not new—in fact it 
might be the most ‘primitive’ of functions for which bodily representations are used, 
associated with the sacred and the aesthetic, with myth and magic, with voodoo dolls 
and religious images. It is the function by which representations are used not to recall 
past bodies, nor to control present bodies, but to imagine future bodies. What I have 
in mind is not much different from the way Tibetan Buddhist meditators make use of 
images of the bodies of deities on tankas and on the walls of temples to imagine 
themselves as enlightened beings, that is to experience themselves as they will one 
day be. This function is perhaps closest to the Deleuzian definition of ‘bodies without 
organs’: bodies of pure desire and potentiality.  
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 In order to illustrate this function, I would like to consider the technologies 
involved in contemporary practices of skateboarding, technologies which go beyond 
the boards and trucks and neoprene wheels upon which skaters traverse the urban 
landscape to include technologies of entextualization like video cameras, fisheye 
lenses, and software for digital editing. Ever since the early days of the sport, ‘bodies 
without organs’ have played a central role in skateboarding (Weyland 2002), although 
the technologies of entextualization and the uses to which these representations have 
been put have changed. In a sense, the history of skateboarding in the past fifty years 
mirrors the development of ‘bodies without organs’ that I outlined above. In the 
sixties and seventies, skaters used analog photography to capture the ephemeral 
moments of their performances in durable documents, which they would send to 
skateboarding magazines for possible publication. In fact, what made early pictorial 
publications like Skateboarder magazine unique was that they depended so much on 
photographs taken by readers. These photographic ‘bodies without organs’ primarily 
served evidentiary and memorial functions: they were used first and foremost to 
document the accomplishments of particular skaters, and the reputations of many of 
the early heroes of the sport were built on these often blurred and grainy amateur 
photos. These pictures also, however, served to build social cohesion, which 
contributed significantly to the early growth of the sport. As skateboarding historian 
Jacko Weyland (2002:162) writes, ‘It wasn’t about self aggrandizement or fame; it 
was about your far-flung tribe recognizing your will to exist and skate under the 
toughest of circumstances.’ 
 There has also been a long tradition of self-publication in skateboarding, as 
skaters early on took control of distributing their ‘bodies without organs’ though 
photocopied ‘zines’ with titles like Body Slam and Curbsnot. This early adoption of 
DIY media, underlines a fundamental ideological construction of skateboarding as a 
sport created and controlled by participants themselves. 
When video technology came on the scene in the early eighties, skateboarders 
were among its earliest adopters, although then most skateboarding videos were 
commercially produced by sporting goods companies to market their products. The 
fist widely distributed skateboarding video made by skaters themselves was The 
Bones Brigade Video Show produced by George Powell and Stacey Peralta in 1984, 
which featured such legendary skaters as Tony Hawk, and Rodney Mullen. It was in 
these early videos that Powell and Peralta developed the techniques and generic 
conventions that informed later amateur videos. 
 As video cameras became increasingly affordable, and with advances in 
digital technology that made sophisticated editing and special effects more and more 
accessible to non-professionals, video became a central part of the activity of 
skateboarding. Learning how to shoot, perform in and edit video to some extent 
became part of learning to be a skater. Skaters began to bring video equipment with 
them when they skated, and to spend hours meticulously editing these videos and 
setting them to music, and then posting them to sites like You Tube, My Space, 
creating online digital archives of their personal accomplishments, the histories of the 
social groups they were part of, and of the locales in which they skated. 
 The skate video is not just a random collection of shots of people skating. It is 
a genre with clear conventions that have particular meaning and currency within this 
discourse community. Typically these videos open with an initial narrative frame in 
which the characters are introduced, characters which often include not just the 
skaters themselves but also various bystanders, passers by and antagonists (usually in 
the form of policemen and security guards). The bulk of course consists of skating, a 
series of successive beautifully executed lines that give the viewer the impression that 
the skater is travelling seamlessly through the environment, weaving a geographic 
narrative, a journey in which successive architectural objects present obstacles for the 
hero to overcome, rather like traditional hero narratives. Music of course is an 
important feature, and soundtracks range from hip hop to punk to Billie Holiday, but 
whatever track is chosen, the footage is edited so that the rhythms of the skating are 
carefully entrained with the rhythms of the music. As with all hero narratives there are 
inevitable setbacks, represented by what skaters call ‘bail footage’, shots of falling 
down. And as with more traditional hero narratives, there are scenes of comic relief 
represented through episodes of ritual insulting or horseplay.  
 The ‘bodies without organs’ that these videos constitute continue to fulfill the 
memorial and evidentiary functions previously performed by photographs.  
Within the subculture of skateboarding, in fact, these videoed documents of individual 
accomplishments are extremely important tools for the ongoing and cyclical process 
of verifying membership and earning cultural capital within the group (Donnelly and 
Young 2001). With each new video posted online, a skater renews this membership 
and revises the status associated with it.    
 And, of course, as with any home videos, the retrospective or memorial 
function is quite important: the chance to relive the good times of past skate sessions, 
to recall past skate spots which have since been re-appropriated by the authorities, and 
to create a digital record of the history of the group and its members. For skaters, 
however, this retrospective function has an important cognitive dimension as well. 
These practices of retrospection are, in fact, integral to the process of learning to be a 
skater, allowing them to reflect on past successes and dissect past failures, to 
understand the motions and timing that go into performing particular tricks by 
attending to what Ferrell (2001:182) and his colleagues call the ‘microphysics of 
representability’ aided by their ability to freeze, slow down and speed up their 
movements. Over time, these videos constitute visual records of particular skaters’ 
learning trajectories, allowing them understand how they have improved and what 
they still need to work on, encouraging them to view their learning from a broader 
temporal perspective. After the videos have been posted online, groups of skaters 
engage in collective recollection through posted comments and feedback, which 
facilitate not just individual learning but also group cohesion. 
 The most important function of these ‘bodies without organs’, I would argue 
however, is documentary or retrospective, but anticipatory, their ability to help 
skateboarders imagine futures and to contribute to their ongoing symbolic projects of 
self-formation. The selves in these videos are not just representations of past bodies, 
they are rehearsals of future ones. 
 To understand this fully one must consider the plight of bodies with organs 
from the perspective of skaters. Anyone who has watched a lot of skateboarding 
videos but not gone out skating would be surprised at how different the real procedure 
is from what one sees on the screen. Far from the unbroken lines of successful tricks 
that make it seem as if the skateboarder is travelling effortlessly through the city, what 
actually occurs is a lot of falling down. Skateboarders do not land tricks far more 
often then they do, and a successful line, an unbroken series of tricks across 
sequential obstacles, is even more rare. The lived experience of an actual 
skateboarding session is a tedious and painful process of trial and error in which error 
is the rule.  
 And so what occurs in the editing process of these videos is not just a reliving 
of the experience but a re-creation of it. The lines documented in skating videos, and 
the chains of lines that give the impression of seamlessly traveling through the urban 
landscape in a sense portray skating not as it is but as it ‘ought to be’, they are at once 
documents of serendipitous moments and the compression of many hours and days of 
failed attempts, at once documents of what really happened, and idealized versions of 
what could happen or should happen, produced through careful selection and editing. 
This is where these ‘bodies without organs’ function in particularly powerful ways for 
skaters, allowing them to string together their successes into idealized portrayals that 
reveal not just their past glory but also their future potential. ‘I’m really not that good, 
you know,’ one skater admitted to me, ‘but if I’m good at editing, I can make myself 
look like a pro.’ 
 One important feature of digital editing which facilitates this function is the 
way it amplifies the potential for desynchronization inherent in all processes of 
entextualization. Digital media makes the relationship between time and space more 
fluid and contingent, allowing time to be slowed down so that the brief, visceral 
adrenalin intensity of a trick can be elongated into a slow, balletic dance, and speeded 
up, so that the tedious and painful processes of learning, the experiences and 
accomplishments of weeks of skating, can be collapsed into a single document. On 
one hand, this manipulation of time helps to mediate the objective observable time of 
the stationary observer with the relative psychological time of the skater in motion. 
‘That’s really the way it feels when you’re doing it,’ said one of my participants, ‘like 
time is slowed down and you’re aware…aware of everything around you and 
everything you do.’ On the other hand, it helps skaters to reconstruct past experiences 
occurring on multiple timescales (Lemke 2000) into coherent narratives -- from the 
level of the micro move which skaters study to understand intricate aspects of timing, 
to the discrete trick, to the line, to the session, to their skating careers, to the various 
local and global histories of skateboarding, fashion and popular music within which 
they situate their lives, the rhythms of all of these timescales carefully synchronized 
so that the sounds of the skateboard along the surface of the ground are entrained to 
the beats of the skater’s favorite song, and to trajectories of learning that have brought 
him to this moment and will carry him into the future.  
Skate videos, and skateboarding itself, are examples of what Lemke (2001) 
calls ‘traversals’– defined as ‘temporal-experiential linkings, sequences, and 
catenations of meaningful elements that deliberately or accidentally, but radically, 
cross boundaries or standardized genres, themes, types, practices, or activities.’ (86) 
What characterizes a traversal, writes Lemke, ‘is precisely that some kind of coherent 
meaning is made in the unpredictable sequencing over “text-scales” that are longer 
than the scales of the standardized elements which are strung together along the 
traversal’ (89). Examples of trasversals include hypertexts, channel-surfing, mall 
cruising, Djing and Mcing, and skateboarding, a practice in which skaters construct 
coherent lines through navigating across disparate and seemingly unrelated features of 
urban architecture, and then re-edit these lines into videos which are later embedded 
into other genres like web pages. ‘Bodies without organs’ become figures in a, 
mobile, reconfigurable textual field, incorporated into the structure of other texts, 
pretexts, cotexts and contexts and various instrumentalities of entextualization and 
interpretation, infinitely multiplying opportunities for producing meaning.  
And these connections ultimately extend back out to the physical body itself. 
Just because these narratives of future successes are virtual and, in some respects, 
highly idealized, does not mean they have no connection to the ‘real world’. The 
anticipatory qualities of the videos skaters have made in the past infiltrate their future 
skate sessions, creating dynamic feedback loops. One of the most memorable lessons 
I received during my fieldwork came when I asked a skater who was practicing at a 
local skate park while listening to his iPod if he tried to skate to the rhythm of the 
music he was listening to, rather naively assuming a linear relationship between one 
mode and activity type and another on a single, linear timescale. ‘No, he said, it 
doesn’t really work that way. When I listen to the music, what the songs remind me of 
are the videos I made and the times I landed the trick and like how it felt.. and so I’m 
thinking about the next video and the music and the editing and stuff.’   
Conclusion 
 The effect of digital technologies on practices of entextualization seems 
primarily to be to amplify those processes that I discussed at the beginning of this 
chapter. The body becomes more deterritorialized, more desynchronized and more 
able to be copied and multiplied. But the most important effect is that is that digital 
technologies make the body more mutable, more editable, more susceptible to the 
imagination, and so more resistant to the reification. They problematize the body 
rather than stabilize it, and this might be in part what people find so threatening about 
them. Digital technologies do not so much capture the body as set into motion new 
processes of pursuing it.  
One of the most important features of the digital age is the way it has created 
for people new opportunities to engage in self-fashioning through narrative projects 
using digital tools – projects which allow them to articulate important moments in 
their lives, to reflect on life’s trajectories, and to reposition themselves as agents in 
and authors of their own stories. Like Tibetan meditators, skaters use their ‘bodies 
without organs’ to visualize themselves not as they are, but as they’d like to be, not 
just to recount to themselves the narratives of how they got to where they are, but to 
write the narratives of where they are going from here.  
 A number of scholars have seen extreme sports like skateboarding and 
snowboarding as metaphors for the new affordances of digital virtualization.  
Rushkoff (2006), for example, compares skateboarders surfing the city streets to 
‘screenagers’ surfing the Internet, and Lévy sees extreme sports as physical 
manifestations of virtualization, attempts to exceed physical limits, to explore other 
velocities as ways of intensifying our physical presence and lifting us momentarily 
out of the here and now. Like an avatar, the skater is ‘never entirely there. Leaving the 
soil and its support he rises into the air, slides along interfaces, follows vanishing 
lines, is deterritorialized and vectorized’ (43). And the body escapes itself, acquires 
new velocities, conquers new spaces, and overflows itself.   
 The entextualization of the body using digital technology, for skateboarders at 
least, rather than resulting in disembodiment, results in re-embodiment. Far from 
alienating these young people from their bodies, these technologies have in many 
cases created for them opportunities to experience their bodies is completely new 
ways, ways which approach what Deleuze and Guattari might have had in mind when 
they spoke of ‘bodies without organs’ as presenting us opportunities to ‘find potential 
movements of deterritorialization, possible lines of flight, experience them, produce 
flow conjunctions here and there, try out continuums of intensities segment by 
segment.’ 
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